Customer Activated Malicious Call Trace
Apart from a few updates, this page is as it was in 1996 - a
discussion of call tracing, especially for one-off calls, in other
countries and how better methods should be adopted in Australia..
Note 19 October 2005:
The following page and the pages it links to are
old, but hopefully still relevent in principle. They used to be
at http://www.ozemail.com.au/~firstpr/mct . By the way, see David
Hickson's UL pages on the problem of "silent calls" - calls which
arrive without any person or announcement to tell the recipient what
the call is about: http://www.users.waitrose.com/~silentcalls/
.
Note 13 November 2005:
ACIF has a draft code C525:2005 Handling of Life
Threatening and Unwelcome Calls Industry Code: http://www.acif.org.au/__data/page/13950/DR_C525_PUBLIC_COMMENT_DRAFT.pdf
which will result in an update to the existing code: http://www.acif.org.au/documents_and_lists/codes/C525
.
The definition of "malicious call" is no longer in section 85ZE of the
Crimes Act, it is in section 474.17 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 ( http://www.comlaw.gov.au , but try
here
for a PDF):
474.17 Using a carriage service to menace, harass or
cause offence
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
(a) the person uses a carriage service; and
(b) the person does so in a way (whether by the method of use or the
content of a communication, or both) that reasonable persons would
regard as being, in all the circumstances, menacing, harassing or
offensive.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 3 years.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), that subsection applies to
menacing, harassing or causing offence to:
(a) an employee of the NRS provider; or
(b) an emergency call person; or
(c) an employee of an emergency service organisation; or
(d) an APS employee in the Attorney-General’s Department acting as a
National Security Hotline call taker.
The section before this, 474.15 is of interest too. It prohibits
using a carriage service (eg. the phone network) to threaten to kill or
seriously harm a person. Section 474.16 concerns calls "with the
intention of inducing a false belief that an explosive, or a dangerous
or harmful substance or thing, has been or will be left in any
place.
A properly designed and well publicised CAMCT service would be of
tremendous value for detering and detecting misuse of the phone network
in many instances where the calls are not repetitive enough to be
effectively traced with conventional approaches, which involve days
delay to set up a trace facility:
- Bomb threats and the like, especially now that everyone is so
alarmed about terrorism.
- One-off malicious calls, such as those which make the recipient
fear their child or partner is dead etc.
- Convenient, legally robust, ways of tracing the source of calls
which violate forthcoming Do-Not-Call legislation: http://www.dcita.gov.au/tel/do_not_call
.
- Calls which are not made with bad intent, but which are
nonetheless alarming, or place an unreasonable burden on the
recipient. These include calls arising from technical malfunction
in the network, and the malfunction or misuse of customer equipment
such as fax machines, computerised dialling systems etc.
To the issues page of this site. To the telemarketing pages of this site
Robin Whittle - 17 December 1996
Keywords: privacy, telecommunications, Australia, malicious call trace
Introduction
Customer Activated Malicious Call Trace (CAMCT) is a technical
facility which enables receivers of malicious calls (under the
Australian Crimes Act: threatening, harassing or offensive) to quickly
activate a trace of the caller. The number of the problem call is
captured at the exchange and sent to investigators - it is not made
available to the receiver of the call.
Australia does not at present have CAMCT for analogue phones, but
all the modern exchanges of Telstra and Optus can support it. It is
available, with some technical restrictions, on ISDN services - mainly
corporate PABXs. The GSM phone system supports it - but it is not used
here as far as I know.
Customer Activated Malicious Call Trace and the administratively
clunkier "Malicious Call Trace" or "Trap" (US term) has nothing to do
with Calling Number Display. Properly administered, CAMCT provides
excellent deterrence against malicious calls, with few if any privacy
problems. Calling Number Display (Caller ID), either on an opt-in basis
(the preferable form, which has never been introduced) or on an opt-out
basis, is practically useless for protecting against malicious calls or
most other unwanted phone calls. CND requires special equipment and is
a privacy, social and phone usage can of worms. CAMCT does not require
equipment, affect normal phone usage, have negative social consequences
or reduce the number of calls which are answered.
My material on Malicious Call Trace has grown over the years, and
is presented here in several parts. This is not necessarily the most
coherent presentation, but it is all I have time for. My work in
privacy advocacy is not paid - so I can't do everything I would like to.
The focus here is on tracing malicious calls. Other kinds of
unwanted calls, such as outbound telemarketing and (for some people,
but generally not for me if they are genuine) market and social
research calls are other common kinds of calls which cause distress and
wasted time. I may expand on this later - for now, I am concentrating
on calls as defined by the Crimes Act, Section 85ZE ( http://www.aust
lii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca191482/s85ze.html ) as threatening,
harassing, or (in the circumstances, to a reasonable person) offensive.
Files in this directory
For the latest updates in reverse date order, click
here!
camct2.html
{17 December 96} An overall description of the technical and
administrative arrangements for Customer Activated Malicious Call Trace
in the USA - from Joe Narun.
mct_cnd_1996.html
{17 December 96} Tabular comparison of the many differences between
Customer Activated Malicious Call Trace and Calling Number Display.
Other resources
I have not found a comprehensive page of links anywhere on malicious
calls and tracing arrangements, so I guess this is it!
Analysis and policy
- Be sure to look at the Calling Number Display
section of my WWW site, for an article on the privacy issues
of the proposed CND service, a link to AUSTEL's report on CND, and some
technical information about CND customer equipment standards.
- The Electronic Privacy Rights Clearinghouse in California
has "How to put an end to unwanted or harassing phone calls" http://www.acusd.edu/%7E
prc/fs/fs3-hrs2.html I think they are overly optimistic about
the value of answering machines - malicious callers can still leave
messages.
- British Telecom have some material relating to
their
malicious call trace operations. This is not Customer Activated Malicious
Call Trace. Their approach seems to require prior arrangements, so it
is only applicable to repeated calls and does not work as a general
deterrent against one-off calls. http://www.bt.ne
t/home/newsroom/document/nr9543a.htm Their Caller Display and
their 1471 readout service for the number of the last incoming call
seem to be the typical Caller ID / CND privacy and social disaster
area.
- BT's August 95 press release http://www.bt.net/
home/newsroom/document/nr9543.htm reveals that the company
received 1,639,741 requests for help in the battle against malicious
calls in one year. This, in a population of 58 million, is no small
problem. Clearly there was no effective deterrent: "more than one
million individual calls made to some 65,000 customers were traced
successfully at the request of the police." The introduction of
Caller Display reduced complaints and hoax calls to emergency numbers
by 20%. I believe that this is attributable to people fearing
detection, rather than a clear understanding of what Caller Display
involved - it is possible to "block" the display of the caller's number
on a per line or per call basis. ("Block" is a simple but prejudicial
term for making a call without the disclosure of the caller's number.)
Calls to emergency numbers have nothing to do with Caller Display - and
the caller's number is displayed to the operators, as it has been for
many years. Callers wishing to make malicious calls need only use a
payphone, or dial 141 before dialling their victim's number to ensure
that their victim sees no number on their display device.
- British Telecom's Code of Practice for Consumers http://www.bt.
net/home/regulate/uk/cop14/cop14-1.htm#m24 mentions that call
tracing can be organised "between 8.30 am and 5 pm Monday to Friday,
where call tracing may be undertaken. You should be prepared to give
evidence if the malicious caller is traced, charged and brought to
court." This is an interesting document for other reasons, for
instance phone bills in braille or large print. I am impressed! Phone
bills can also be read by humans, over the phone, to the customer
before the bill is mailed.
- AUSTEL Privacy Advisory Committee's report on Calling
Number
Display http://lobby.auste
l.gov.au/info/reports/paccnd/paccnd0.htm notes (in the Preface
s Section 3, first dot point) "AUSTEL encourages carriers with fixed
network service infrastructure to consider offering their directly
connected customers an alternative call trace activation in conjunction
with their CND service offerings."
Section 6.3 of the report's Chapter IV http://lobby.auste
l.gov.au/info/reports/paccnd/paccnd4.htm refers to Telstra's
existing Malicious Call Trace facility, but says that it is basically
adequate. The PAC does not recommend a more accessible tracing facility
(ie. Customer Activated Malicious Call Trace) as a precondition for CND
introduction, but I believe they should have. To sell people the
problematic CND service (which many will be attracted to in the belief
that it will be effective against malicious calls), whilst withholding
CAMCT, which is essentially a free, highly effective service without
privacy problems, would be a scandal. It would also be a source of
increased customer complaints, decreased trust of the phone companies
and do very little to deter malicious callers - who will simply make
calls without allowing their number to be displayed.
- Police detectives from Mankato in Minnesota, in
their 1995
report:
http://www.ic.mankato.mn.us/reg9/kato/safety/reports/review95/police2.html
state: "Our ability to deal with nuisance phone calls has
increased this year with the advent of the Customer Originated Trace
(COT), a feature all customers of MCTC now have on their phones. This
allows the customer to trace nuisance calls. The phone numbers and the
time of each call is tracked on a computer in the detective's office.
Through the use of this valuable feature we were able to track down a
female who had phoned in numerous bomb threats to the McDonald's
restaurant on Madison Ave."
- Proceedings of the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities, including testimony from the Boston Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility, regarding Caller ID
introduction in 1991: http://www.cpsr.org/dox/program/caller-
id/cpsr_testimony_boston_cnid_hear.html includes "The
claim that Calling-Phone ID is the only, or best, way to reduce these
calls is false. Common-
sense tells us that the most effective deterrent to crank calls is for
would-be perpetrators to know their identity can be determined easily
by the authorities. The best way to accomplish this is not to offer
Calling-Phone ID but to make another service, Call Trace, widely
available and easily affordable."
- Telstra does not offer Customer Activated
Malicious Call
Trace (except on ISDN services) - only a more cumbersome approach which
must be activated after a complaint by a customer, if resources are
available and if it is thought that the problem is serious enough and
that calls are likely to persist. A document outlining Telstra's
expectations of its customers and the company's responsibilities to its
customers is at: http://w
ww.telecom.com.au/connections/guide/section4.htm#sect4b4 Its
good to see a clear statement of expectations and responsibilities.
Unfortunately the company's Privacy Protection Policy (which covers
intrusion) is not yet available on the web.
Telcos offering Customer Activated Call Trace
- See the above links to British Telecom. The following are some of
the companies I found with an Alta Vista search on 30 November 1996.
There would be other telcos who do not have English language WWW sites
who also offer CAMCT.
- Cambridge Cable is a smaller telephone and cable
TV
company in the UK. I am not sure that offer telephony via special
interfaces to HFC cable as Optus Vision does. In the past "cable"
telephone companies in the UK used a separate twisted pair into the
home - so it was standard analogue telephony. http://www.camcable.co.uk/before.
html indicates that they offer Customer Activated
Malicious Call Trace. There is no mention of Caller Display or any
equivalent to BT's 1471 last call number readout service.
- A local phone company in Rochester, New York State, USA
offers CAMCT ("Call Trace" for the Annoyance Call Bureau) with a US
$1.50 activation fee: http://www.fron
tiercorp.com/rochestertel/contact/reach.html "Call Tracing
should be used to trace calls that are life-threatening or harassing in
nature; calls for which you might want to press legal charges. You will
not receive the telephone number of the call you trace. A $1.50 fee
applies for each call successfully traced." http://www.frontie
rcorp.com/rochestertel/services/features.html tells customers how
to hang up and dial *64 (Touchtone) or 1164 (Rotary/Pulse) to activate
CAMCT. "Listen for message. Note the date and time of the call
traced. Call your local law enforcement agency to file a police report
and secure a crime report number. Contact the Rochester Telephone
Annoyance Call Bureau at 777-5749. Once we have identified a pattern,
we will forward the information to your local law enforcement agency."
This hundred year old phone company does not seem to be very big, but
it has every conceivable service, including ISDN and dial-up Internet.
- Nynex, a New York / New England US telco, in http://www.nynex.com/pr
oducts/b_call_trace.html states: "Call Trace is an
effective way of combatting annoying, threatening and harrassing phone
calls. Using the switching power of the NYNEX network, you can
accomplish on your own what used to require complicated intervention.
Call Trace will trace a bothersome call, record your number and the
number of the caller, then forward the information to the Annoyance
Call Bureau. . . . Your phone is already equipped for Call Trace, and
there's no charge for the connection." However it only works for
calls in the local area. No such problem would be encountered with
CAMCT in Australia - calls from anywhere in Australia, including
mobiles, would be traceable, since the carriers all use CCS7
communications between their modern exchanges and pass the caller's
number between themselves. "To Activate: Touch-tone: Hang up, lift
receiver and press *57. Rotary: Hang up, lift receiver and dial 1157.
To initiate an investigation, call the Annoyance Call Bureau (listed in
your local directory) and your local law enforcement agency. You'll be
charged $1.50 for each successful trace."
- Southwestern Bell, in http://www.sbc.com/swb
ell/314/single_female.html describes CAMCT with a US $8
per activation charge and a US $7.75 setup fee - in area code 314.
There are no monthly charges. "Call Trace is the easy way to put a
stop to those harassing or obscene calls. Call Trace initiates an
immediate trace of the last call you received. The number from which
the threatening or obscene calls are made will be provided only to
Southwestern Bell Telephone security personnel and appropriate law
enforcement agencies should you pursue an investigation." http://www.sbc.com/swbell/kc/e
asyopt.html gives alternative prices in other area
codes: $10 per use and a $1 monthly fee in 913 and 316, and $8 per use
and no monthly fee in 816 and 417. I presume this is due to differing
regulations from the relevant Public Utilities Commissions. This page
has an extensive table of prices for many services.
- Canadian telco AGT in http://www.agt.net/agt1/
smtouch.html#RTFToC11 describes its CAMCT service, which has no
startup fee nor any need to enable the service: "AGT Call Trace
service is available to any customer at any time. It costs $3.00 per
traced call." "AGT Call Trace service puts an end to threatening
or harassing calls. It initiates an immediate trace of the last call
you received." Customers dial *57 (or 1157) and if the trace is
successful, "you will be instructed to call the police to pursue
further action. Traced numbers will only be released to the police."
- A rural telco in South Carolina provides Call Trace (no
details of what approach) for US $4 a month: http://www.lowco
untry.com/lowcountry/ptelco.html#SSF "Trace harassing or
life threatening telephone calls on demand. We release traced
information to appropriate law enforcement officials. You must file a
complaint with the proper authorities and fill out a Complaint Form at
our offices. This feature works with calls within our service area."
- Another small telco in South Carolina provides
"Customer
Originated Trace - $3.50 / month. Trace harassing or life threatening
telephone calls on demand. We release traced information to appropriate
law enforcement officials. You must file a complaint with the proper
authorities and fill out a Call Trace Request Form at our offices.": http://www.hargray.com/hargr
ay/htelco.html This seems pretty good, but in addition
to selling people's personal information (their phone numbers as
callers) by offering Caller ID, like most other US telcos, they have
the gall to charge $2 a month for a "blocking" option for Caller ID. In
other words, they give their customers three choices: Have their
numbers sold to the people they call, dial a "blocking" code before
each number to stop this, or pay $24 a year! This is the sort of
behaviour by telcos - like selling discs of subscriber numbers ready
for telemarketers and direct mail - which make me wonder what their
commitment to their customers is. It is like a hotel making money from
sales people who knock on the door of the paying guests - and then
offering for a fee to the guests additional protection to keep the
sales people at bay!
- Saskatchewan 580k line telco Sasktel in http://www.sasktel.com/st4148.html
offer CAMCT without charge and apparently without the need for
prior arrangement. I don't necessarily think this is a good idea.
Firstly, some prior arrangement should probably be made so that
customers have some way of stopping misuse of the service by someone in
their home. Secondly I think a small to moderate fee per activation is
a good means of deterring frivolous use - however I have no information
on how much a problem that would be.
- A document at http://www.ai.org/iurc/act
ion/engine/960621.html , from the Indiana Utility
Regulatory Commission relates to a US telco called the Geetingsville
Telephone Company at what looks like a $2 per month charge for any
month in which Customer Originated Malicious Call Trace is activated -
apparently irrespective of the number of activations.
- Canadian telco NewTel in offers CAMCT for CA $5
per
activation with a limit of CA $10 per month: http://enterprise.ne
wcomm.net/ntc/images/smartouc.htm "Use Call Trace
to protect you and your family against obscene, harassing or
threatening calls 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Call Trace is already
on your phone as part of your basic telephone service, so there’s no
monthly subscription fee. If you receive an upsetting call - hang up.
Then immediately pick up the receiver again. After you hear the dial
tone, press *57 on a TouchTone® phone or 1157 on a rotary phone. A
recorded voice message will confirm that the call has been traced. To
take legal action against the caller, contact your local police
department. But remember, Call Trace should only be used in serious
circumstances."
- Australia's major carrier Telstra is justifiably proud of its
efforts in connecting customers in this vast country, but what about Canadian
telco Northwestel, who serves 100,000 customers spread over 4
million square kilometres. In http://www
.yukonweb.wis.net/business/nwtel/calling.htmld/#trace they
offer Customer Activated Malicious Call Trace for between CA $3.50 and
$5.95 a month. If this 565 employee company can provide CAMCT,
then why not Australia's telcos?
- Muenster Telephone Corporation of Texas: http://host.ld.cent
uryinter.net/nortexinfo/mtc/services.html provides
Customer Activated Malicious Call Trace for US $10.00 per successful
trace activation with a maximum charge of $25.00 in any one month. Like
most of these CAMCT services, there is a voice message to confirm that
the customer wants to proceed with the trace, and to confirm that it
has been successful.
- The Logan Telephone Cooperative of Ohio, in http://logantele.com/mre-
info.htm#cot offers "Customer Originated Trace -
Lets you trace harassing calls and if you wish, to prosecute the
caller. Residential - $2.50/month Business - $3.75/month ($7.50 each
police report)". Quite what this means I am not sure.
- The University of Alabama at Birmingham, in http://uabcomm.comm.uab.edu/a
nnoy.htm gives details of traditional tracing
arrangements, with written requests following a malicious call. This is
not CAMCT and would be useless for deterring or detecting malicious
callers who made one call, or a series of calls within a day or so.
- The University of Okalahoma Department of Public Safety
has a guide to various kinds of unwanted phone call, and information
about a limited call trace facility: http://www.ou.edu/oupd/crankpho.
htm
- Telecommunications Services of Trinidad and Tobago offer CAMCT: http://www.tstt.net.tt/resid.htm
There is no mention of costs. "This service allows you to
trace the last call you received by entering the *57. To trace a call,
you must replace the handset and get dialtone immediately after
receiving the call and enter *57. An announcement will inform you
whether the trace was successful or not. Traces are made on a per-
call basis so, you will have to go through the process whenever you
wish to trace calls. Information on traced calls will be recorded by
TSTT and provided to the appropriate authorities."
Miscellaneous links
CALL TRACE Call Trace allows the called party to
initialize an automatic trace of the last
incoming call received. When the customer
activates a trace, a message containing
the following information is output to the
SCC Maintenance Channel:
1. Time the trace was activated
2. DN of the calling party
3. MLHG/multiline indicator
4. DN and LEN of the customer
requesting the trace
5. Date and time of the TTY message
6. Date and time the call being
traced was received
7. Privacy Indicator
8. CWT Indicator
Activation Code: *57
No Deactivation Code required
These details and terminology are for the AT& T 1A ESS exchange,
which is not used in Australia.
- Matav Rt. in Hungary have what they call a Malicious Call Trace
service: http://www.matav.hu/Se
rvice/digifon_e.html#rossz but it seems at odds with
the usual approach. Firstly they give the number to the victim - no
mention of giving it to the Police - and secondly the caller can make
the call in such as way as to inhibit this function. Weird.
ISDN related links
ISDN stands for "Integrated Services Digital Network". ISDN refers
to several things: specific, internationally standardised ways of
bringing telephony to the home or office digitally, the
protocols with which the customer equipment interacts with the
telephone exchange and the network, and the way the exchanges
communicate digitally - firstly for the call data and secondly for
setting, managing and terminating calls with the CCS7 inter-exchange
protocol. There are two major means of connecting ISDN services to
customers. Firstly, primary rate ISDN (usually on a pair of fibres, but
can be on two twisted pairs) - 30 x 64 k bit/sec B bearer channels and
one 64 k bit/sec D channel for control information. Secondly, Basic
Rate ISDN over a single twisted pair. This carries two 64 k bit/sec B
bearer channels and one 16 k bit/sec D channel for control. Each B
bearer can handle a normal voice call or a data call - with data being
directly transferred from one customer's equipment, to the exchange,
through the network to another exchange and to another customer's
equipment.
The most important thing about ISDN, from the point of view of
malicious calls, is that the telephone (or computer interface or
whatever) is able to communicate with the exchange at any time over the
D channel - including while the call is in progress. This enables an
ISDN phone or PABX to alert the network of a malicious call while
the call is in progress. The technical standards for how ISDN
Customer Equipment does this are evolving and not currently mandatory
in Europe. There is more to this than what I have available here -
please email me if you are interested in ISDN Malicious Call Trace
customer equipment standards.
There are reasons why this "Malicious Call Trace" during the call
is not just a better way of doing it - compared to hanging up and
dialling a special number. It is in fact the only practical way of
doing it. With an ISDN PABX, which may have 30 calls coming into it on
one PR-ISDN line, a PABX customer who hangs up and then dials an MCT
number makes it hard or impossible for the exchange and the PABX to
figure out which of the 30 channels the call came in on. Secondly, that
channel is quite likely to have another call on it now - or even a
subsequent call - making it very difficult to be sure which call the
victim is trying to have traced. These issues are also a problem with
an analogue connected PABX.
With Basic Rate ISDN, which only has two D channels, these
problems may be lessened, however the outgoing call from a phone (one
of many phones and other devices which may be connected to the NT-1
interface box at the customer's site) will not necessarily make a call
to the exchange on the D channel on which it most recently received a
call. In addition, the exchange can have up to ten numbers associated
with a single BR-ISDN service, each of which can be associated with a
particular phone (or other device) at the customer's site.
However the solution to these problems - specific protocols for
the customer equipment to tell the exchange of a malicious call in
progress - are greatly superior to the analogue phone arrangement of
hanging up and dialling a special number.
- Some detailed technical material from Telehallintokeskus in
Finland on the "keypad protocol" for ISDN signalling between the
customer equipment and the exchange is at http://www.thk.fi/tele/suomi/gfi93
03.htm "GFI 9303 19.5.1994 GUIDELINES FOR
IMPLEMENTATION ISDN SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICES KEYPAD PROTOCOL" I have
not checked this out in detail - it may not be totally up-to-
date.
Updates sorted by date
This is a list of updates and new files in this section, in reverse
date order.
- 1996 December 17 /mct/index.html created. The first two
mail-outs, on the UK and US situations are at camct1.htm and
camct2.htm. cnd_mct.htm leads to a Word file which contains a table
showing the many differences between Calling Number Display and
Customer Activated Malicious Call Trace.
- 2005 October 19. Placed at
http://www.firstpr.com.au/issues/mct/ - but not really updated, so many
links will be dead.